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ANTITRUST: A NEW TOOL FOR ORGANIZED LABOR? t
JAMES M. ALTMAN' t
Historically, the antitrust laws' have victimized organized labor.
Although Congress passed the Sherman Act' to combat the threat to a
free market economy posed by trusts and other big business combina-
tions, 3 the Act initially was invoked against labor unions.4 The Su-
preme Court's 1908 decision in Loewe v. Lawlor5 that union activities
were not wholly immune from antitrust liability led directly to devas-
tating treble damage awards against individual union members.6 For
the next thirty years, Sherman Act injunctions crippled organized la-
bor's use of its chief economic weapons-strikes and secondary boy-
cotts.' It is not surprising, then, that organized labor's attitude toward
the antitrust laws has been primarily defensive: unions generally have
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t. After this Article went to press, the Supreme Court decided Associated Gen. Contractors v.
California State Council of Carpenters, 51 U.S.L.W. 4139 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983). The Court held
that unions lacked standing under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), to bring a treble
damage action based upon an alleged conspiracy by a multiemployer bargaining unit and others to
coerce its members, competitors, and customers not to deal with construction general contractors
and subcontractors who had signed collective bargaining agreements with the plaintiff unions. See
infra text accompanying notes 13-14, 251-55.
"i" Member, Schulman & Abarbanel of New York, N.Y. B.A. 1971, J.D. 1975, Yale Uni-
versity. Member, New York, District of Columbia, and Connecticut Bars. This Article is based on
a presentation made at the AFL-CIO Lawyers Conference held in Minnieapolis, Minn., in May,
1982.
The author would like to express his gratitude and appreciation to Howard Schulman and
Ellen Schecter for presenting opportunities to develop this Article, and to Jay Levy-Warren,
whose penetrating questions and insightful analysis regarding some of the issues discussed in this
Article helped greatly.
I The antitrust laws referred to in this paper are the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)), and the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 18 U.S.C. §§ 402, 660, 3285, 3691, and 29 U.S.C.
§§ 52-53 (1976)).
2 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)).
- See, e.g., 21 CONG. REC. 2456-57 (1890); see also United States v. South-Eastern Under-
writers Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553-55 (1944); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 492-93
(1940).
4 In 12 of the first 13 successful antitrust lawsuits the defendants were unions. E. BERMAN,
LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT 3 (1930).
5 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
6 The treble damage award against individual union members and officers caused many of
them to lose their homes. See Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 248 (1962); see also
Savings Bank of Danbury v. Loewe, 242 U.S. 357 (1917) (attachment of savings accounts).
7 See, e.g., Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37
(1927)(refusal to handle nonunion goods); Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S.
295 (1925) (strike); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) (secondary boy-
cott). See generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
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tried to strengthen and broaden the argument that their activities are
exempt from antitrust liability.8
Perhaps as a consequence, organized labor has made no sustained
attempt to use the antitrust laws as a sword against anticompetitive
conduct by employers that redounds to its detriment. Until recently, the
few suits filed by labor organizations attempting to use the Act against
employers were usually dismissed, primarily on two grounds. First,
courts have held unions' antitrust complaints legally insufficient be-
cause the alleged employers' combinations were not found to restrain
commercial competition in markets for goods or services.9 Second, un-
ions and their members have been held to lack standing to assert anti-
trust claims against employers.10 Some courts have also stated that suits
that would survive these two initial hurdles would nevertheless suc-
cumb to a third: the argument that the statutory labor exemption from
antitrust liability, based on the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts, 1
also protects employers.1"
These three issues - sufficiency of the complaint, standing, and
the scope of the labor exemption - are now before the Supreme Court
in California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated General Con-
tractors.8 In the decision below, the Ninth Circuit upheld the suffi-
8 Labor organizations are protected by two exemptions from the antitrust laws. The first of
these is the "statutory" exemption based on § 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976), § 20 of
the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976), and §§ 4, 5, and 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, and 113 (1976). See infra notes 87-113 and accompanying text. The second is
the "nonstatutory" exemption based on our national labor policy favoring collective bargaining.
See Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676, 689-90
(1965); see also Connell Const. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S.
616, 622 (1975).
1 See, e.g., Prepmore Apparel v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 431 F.2d 1004, 1007 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971); Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 319 F.2d 366, 373
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963); United Brick & Clay Workers v. Junction City Clay
Co., 158 F.2d 552, 554 (6th Cir. 1946); Clune v. Publishers' Ass'n, 214 F. Supp. 520, 525, 531
(S.D.N.Y.), afld, 314 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1963) (per curiam).
1 See, e.g., Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952); Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employ-
ees, 182 F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1950); Clune, 214 F. Supp. at 525. These cases all involved claims of
anti-union activity by employers. Employees challenging other kinds of anticompetitive behavior
on the part of employers have also been held to lack standing under the antitrust laws. See Reibert
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973)(merger);
Bywater v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 73,759 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(dumping).
1 See supra note 8.
' See, e.g., Clune, 214 F. Supp. at 528-31 (injunctive relief against employers under Sher-
man Act prohibited by § 20 of Clayton Act and by Norris-LaGuardia Act).
13 648 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 998 (1982). Also before the Court
is the question whether an antitrust action can be brought when the challenged employers' conduct
involves alleged unfair labor practices within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. After Con-
nell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975), in which
the Court held that an agreement could violate both § 8(e) of the Labor-Management Relations
Act and the antitrust laws, a preemption attack on a labor antitrust complaint seems frivolous.
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ciency of the labor organizations' claim. The complaint alleged that the
defendant association had encouraged general contractors to form non-
union shops and divisions and that the association's member firms had
coerced landowners and general contractors to deal only with firms that
had not signed collective bargaining agreements with the unions.,' The
court also denied the employers' motion to dismiss on grounds of stand-
ing and rejected the employers' effort to clothe themselves with the pro-
tection of the statutory labor exemption.
This Article analyzes these issues in order to determine whether
and under what circumstances organized labor can use the antitrust
laws as a sword. Part I concludes that both labor organizations and
unionized employees may raise legally sufficient Sherman Act chal-
lenges to employers' conduct that has an overall negative impact on the
competitive structure of either product or labor markets. Part II ana-
lyzes the legislative history of the statutory labor exemption and its
treatment by the Supreme Court, demonstrating that the exemption
should not be interpreted to immunize employer conduct from antitrust
liability. Part III concludes that unions and employees should have
standing to obtain treble damages for at least some employer violations
of the antitrust laws.
The analytic approach adopted here differs somewhat from that of
most courts adjudicating labor antitrust cases challenging employers'
conduct. Those courts have reasoned primarily on the basis of the Su-
preme Court's post-1940 labor antitrust decisions,15 nearly all of which
have involved labor organizations seeking to avoid antitrust liability by
claiming a labor exemption.16 The Supreme Court's general discussions
of antitrust liability in those cases appear as background to its focus on
the exemption issue. They therefore provide a less reliable guide for
analyzing the question of employers' antitrust liability than the tradi-
tional framework of antitrust law involving businesses.
That conclusion applies particularly to the employers' argument that preemption is required be-
cause antitrust remedies are inconsistent with NLRB remedies or those of the federal courts under
§ 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act. The Connell Court expressly rejected the view
that labor law and antitrust remedies are inconsistent. See Connell, 421 U.S. at 626, 634, & 635
n.17.
4 648 F.2d at 529-30.
15 See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors, 648 F.2d at 531-32 (concluding that the plaintiff
unions stated a sufficient Sherman Act claim by resting heavily upon Connell, a case rejecting a
union's claim for exemption from antitrust liability). But cf. id. at 531 n.5 (citing group boycott
cases involving entrepreneurs).
16 See, e.g., H.A. Artists & Assocs. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704 (1981); Connell,
421 U.S. 616 (1975); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Jewel Tea;
Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797 (1945);
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469
(1940).
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For the purpose of analysis, this Article makes the following sim-
plifying assumptions: first, that the challenged employers' conduct is
jointly undertaken in a manner constituting or furthering a conspiracy
or combination;17 second, that the conduct is not undertaken jointly
with labor groups and does not fall within the nonstatutory labor ex-
emption from antitrust liability for conduct that furthers the national
policy favoring collective bargaining;"8 and third, that the challenged
employers' conduct is in or affects interstate commerce.' 9
Resolution of the standing and the statutory labor exemption is-
sues logically depends upon the nature of the particular employers'
conduct claimed to violate the antitrust laws. The issue of substantive
liability therefore will be considered first.
I. VALID SECTION 1 CLAIMS AGAINST EMPLOYERS
A. The Traditional Section 1 Framework
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combina-
tion .. .or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce."20 Because
this language is so vague and all-encompassing, recourse to it is virtu-
ally useless in establishing section l's meaning. Consequently, it is nec-
essary to look to the Court's "traditional framework of analysis under
§ 1' 21 in order to determine when employers' conduct is unlawful.
The purpose of the antitrust laws, and of section 1 in particular, is
to promote economic competition.22 As Justice Brandeis observed in
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, "[elvery agreement concern-
ing trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.12 3 Clearly, however, not
all such restraints create antitrust liability. The Court has relied on the
concept of a "market" to determine whether challenged conduct is suffi-
1'7 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "[elvery contract, combination . . . or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade .... 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Since it takes more than one party to agree,
conspire, or combine, § 1 by its terms requires a multiplicity of economic entities. See, e.g., United
States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). The assumption throughout this Article is that this
§ I prerequisite has been satisfied by the challenged employers' conduct.
"' See Connell, 421 U.S. at 622. The question of when employers may invoke the nonstatu-
tory exemption is beyond the scope of this Article.
1'9 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits restraints of "trade or commerce among the several
States. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Since in passing the Act Congress exercised its power under
the commerce clause to its fullest extent, see Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S.
427, 435 (1932), a § 1 claim can satisfy the requisite connection with interstate commerce under
either the "in commerce" or the "effect on commerce" theory. See McClain v. Real Estate Bd.,
444 U.S. 232, 242 (1980).
20 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
"1 Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
12 See National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978);
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
23 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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ciently anticompetitive to violate section 1. Although the types and
structures of particular markets may vary, in the perfectly competitive
market numerous buyers and numerous sellers of a particular good or
service act in accordance with the classical economic laws of supply and
demand.24 In such a market, price is the "central nervous system of the
economy"; 25 it reflects the optimal allocation of resources and maxi-
mizes consumer welfare. 8 Under the prevailing section 1 standard, the
"rule of reason,"27 the trier of fact evaluates all the circumstances and
consequences of the challenged action to ascertain whether on the whole
it suppresses or destroys competition in a market.28 If the conduct has
that effect, it is an unreasonable restraint of trade, regardless of its na-
ture. In the case of certain conduct whose anticompetitive effects are
"pernicious" and well-known, such as price-fixing and group boy-
cotts, 29 the Court has established a rule of per se unreasonableness,
substituting proof that such conduct occurred for the elaborate economic
investigation required under the rule of reason.30
Although this traditional framework has been used primarily in
cases involving businesses, its emphasis on competitive market structure
is also evident in an early labor antitrust case, Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader."1 In the spring of 1937, Local 706 of the Federation of Full
Fashioned Hosiery Workers requested a closed shop agreement 2 from
Apex, a Philadelphia manufacturer. Following several refusals by the
company, Local 706 forcibly seized the plant and commenced a sit-
down strike that foreclosed all hosiery production for more than three
months and prevented interstate shipment of 130,000 dozen pairs of
finished stockings. The company sued Local 706 under section 1 of the
Act, and the jury returned a verdict and an award of damages against
the union that the court trebled.
", See United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392 (1956) ("[ilf a
large number of buyers and sellers deal freely in a standardized product. . . we have complete or
pure competition").
" United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940).
2' See Northern Paciic, 356 U.S. at 4.
27 See generally Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
" See National Socy of Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 687-92; Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 72-75.
2, For purposes of this Article, a group boycott is defined as an agreement between two or
more persons to the effect that one or more of them will not buy from, sell to, or in any other way
deal commercially with some other economic entity not a party to the agreement under any cir-
cumstances or unless some particular set of conditions is met. This definition is a slight modifica-
tion of that proposed in Bauer, Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to Deal: A Rule Ripe for
Reexamination, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 685, 685 n.5 (1979).
3o See, e.g., Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
31 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
3 A closed shop agreement provides that an employer will hire and retain only union mem-
bers. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 639-42 (1976).
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The question before the Supreme Court was whether preventing
the interstate shipment of the finished stockings was the kind of "re-
straint of trade or commerce" prohibited by section L" Chief Justice
Hughes, joined by Justices McReynolds and Roberts, thought it was.
They argued in dissent that obstructing the shipment of goods in inter-
state commerce "falls directly within the language of the Sherman Act
in its natural import" 4 and that there was no reason to narrow that
literal reading of section 1.
Justice Stone, speaking for the Court, disagreed. He formulated a
general view of the meaning of "restraint of trade" by focusing on
"three circumstances relating to the history and application of the Act
which are of striking significance.135 First, the Act's legislative history
revealed the evil at which it was aimed:
The end sought was the prevention of restraints to free competition
in business and commercial transactions which tended to restrict
production, raise prices or otherwise control the market to the det-
riment of purchasers or consumers of goods and services, all of
which had come to be regarded as a special form of public injury."
Second, the Court had held the Act applicable only in cases involving
"some form of restraint upon commercial competition in the marketing
of goods or services."13 7 Third, "contracts for the restriction or suppres-
sion of competition in the market, agreements to fix prices, divide mar-
keting territories, apportion customers, restrict production and the like
practices" were illegal and unenforceable under the common-law doc-
trine of restraint of trade, from which the Act originated and drew its
scope.38 These restraints were condemned at common law and thus
prohibited by the Act because in most cases their purpose or effect was
to raise or fix market prices. 9
Applying his conclusion that a "restraint of trade" required some
substantial effect on the competitive structure of a market and therefore
ultimately upon market price, 0 Stone held that preventing the inter-
state shipment of finished stockings did not violate section 1. Although
Local 706's strike restrained the flow of interstate commerce, "the delay
of these shipments was not intended to have and had no effect on prices
33 310 U.S. at 487, 490.
34 Id. at 517.
35 Id. at 490.
11 Id. at 493 (footnote omitted). The pertinent legislative history is discussed at 310 U.S. at
493 n.15.
'7 Id. at 495 (footnote omitted).
38 Id. at 497-501.
39 Id. at 497.
40 Id. at 500-01.
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of hosiery in the market.""' Accordingly, Stone found that no restraint
of trade violating section 1 had been shown.
Stone's approach to labor antitrust questions in Apex was eclipsed
a year later, when Justice Frankfurter pioneered a different approach
in United States v. Hutcheson."2 Stone's focus on whether the chal-
lenged conduct was the kind of restraint prohibited by the Act was su-
perseded by what appeared at first to be a more convenient question,
whether the challenged conduct was exempt from antitrust liability by
virtue of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts.4 But the Hutcheson
approach has led to the creation of labor exemptions so factually com-
plicated and bounded by such uncertain contours that at least one dis-
trict court has wondered whether the Apex approach might not be pref-
erable.44 Thus, Stone's approach, which always retained its validity if
not its desirability,45 may be used more frequently in the future.
B. Application to Employers' Conduct
1. Employers' Anti-Union Conduct
Antitrust challenges to employers' anti-union conduct should be
analyzed under the Apex approach and the traditional section 1 frame-
work,"6 not under the complex and confusing Hutcheson approach that
is adopted when unions are defendants. Measured against the tradi-
tional standard, such challenges will succeed only if the employers' con-
duct is aimed at or results in an "unreasonable" restraint on competi-
tion: some impairment of the competitive structure of a market not
justified by some pro-competitive effect of that conduct. Thus, courts
uniformly have dismissed union antitrust complaints challenging em-
ployers' anti-union conduct that has neither the purpose nor the effect
of impairing the competitive structure in any market. For example,
courts have held that a defensive lockout by employers acting jointly in
order to force a union's agreement to bargaining demands does not in
itself violate section 1."' Similarly, the creation and maintenance of an
41 Id. at 501.
42 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
43 See infra text accompanying notes 104-13.
44 Home Box Office v. Directors Guild, 531 F. Supp. 578, 613 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("The
complexities and uncertainties of labor-antitrust law have reached such proportions that perhaps
courts should begin their analysis of such cases by examining whether an antitrust violation ...
has been alleged or shown").
45 Apex has been cited with approval in the Supreme Court's two most recent labor antitrust
decisions. H.A. Artists & Assocs. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704, 715 n.16 (1981); Connell
Const. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 636 (1975).
46 See supra text accompanying notes 20-41.
47 See, e.g., Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 598 v. Morris, 511 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Wash.
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employers' strike insurance plan or other mutual aid pact has been held
not to violate section 1:11 One employer's supplying strike breakers to
enable a struck employer to continue operations does not violate that
section.49 Nor do employers violate section 1 when one employer helps
another refuse to bargain, thereby injuring the union.5" Citing Apex,
federal courts dismissed the union's complaint in each of these cases
because there were no allegations suggesting that the employers' con-
duct restrained "commercial competition." Thus, under current case
law, employers do not violate section 1 when they conspire, agree, or
combine soley to destroy a union.
2. Anticompetitive Acts Affecting a Product Market
Unions have stated legally sufficient claims, however, when they
have alleged some sort of employers' group boycott excluding union-
signatory employers from a "product market" (defined here as any
market other than those service markets in which the service bought
and sold is labor).51 In Associated General Contractors,5 2 the Ninth
Circuit refused to dismiss the unions' complaint because the alleged
employers' boycott of union-signatory firms hurt not only the plaintiff
unions but also the boycotted union-signatory general contractors and
subcontractors. Thus, the alleged agreement restrained competition in
two product markets, that for general contractors' services and that for
subcontractors' services. One district court has applied similar reason-
ing to an employers' agreement to select a general contractor for a con-
struction project through a closed bidding process in which only nonun-
ionized general contractors were invited to bid. The court held that the
1981); Clune v. Publishers' Ass'n, 214 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y.), afld, 314 F.2d 343 (2d Cir.
1963).
48 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 319 F.2d 366 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830
(1963).
49 See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Wetterau Foods, 597 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1979);
United Brick & Clay Workers v. Junction City Clay Co., 158 F.2d 552 (6th Cir. 1946).
"0 See, e.g., Prepmore Apparel v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 431 F.2d 1004, 1006-07
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971).
5' The distinction between labor markets and service markets may appear unclear in certain
instances - for example, in the case of self-employed professionals or entrepreneurs, who sell
both a "service" and their own labor. In most cases, however, a distinction can be drawn fairly
easily. In California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 648 F.2d 527
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 998 (1982), for example, the defendant contractors com-
pete in a service market - the market for building construction services. The members of the
plaintiff unions, however, compete in a labor market - the service they are selling is their own
labor.
52 California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 648 F.2d 527 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 998 (1982); see also Carpenter's Local Union No. 1846 v.
Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 531-35, (5th Cir. 1982) (concerted refusal to deal with
union-signatory contractors).
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agreement would violate section 1, if proven.53 The courts in both cases
concluded that unreasonable restrictions would be placed upon free and
unfettered competition in the relevant market if unionized firms were
prevented from competing because of the employers' preference for
nonunion firms.
In cases involving sham unions, bona fide unions have overcome
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim because their complaints
have been construed to allege an unreasonable restraint upon competi-
tion in a product market. In International Association of Heat & Frost
Insulators v. United Contractors Ass'n," twenty-eight construction un-
ions sued the United Contractors Association, a trade association of em-
ployers in the construction business in Pennsylvania, along with the
Trades and Crafts Union (TCU), the purported collective bargaining
representative of those employers' employees. The complaint alleged
that the employer association and TCU had conspired to eliminate
competition in the construction industry in western Pennsylvania. The
means to accomplish that objective focused on the labor market: by
dominating and assisting TCU, then establishing it as the collective
bargaining representative of their employees and executing a sham col-
lective bargaining agreement with it, the conspiring employers paid
their employees lower wages than other construction employers in
western Pennsylvania that had collective bargaining agreements with
bona fide unions, such as the plaintiffs. Paying lower wages, in turn,
gave the conspiring employers a competitive advantage in job-bidding
over bona fide, union-signatory construction employers. The district
court dismissed the complaint, holding that the labor exemptions to the
antitrust laws immunized the defendants' actions from liability. The
Third Circuit reversed.
The appellate court's analysis began with the observation that the
district court had not considered the legal significance of the allegation
that conspiring employers were also TCU's members and officers. If
TCU really were a dominated labor organization, reasoned the court,
then it was not exempt from antitrust liability. 5 The collective bar-
gaining agreement sub judice was, therefore, an agreement among em-
ployers increasing their margin of profit as entrepreneurs which should
53 See Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 110 L.R.R.M.
3140, 3144 (E.D. La. 1981); see also East Central Ohio Bldg. & Construction Trades Council v.
Landmark, Inc., No. 76-371 (N.D. Ohio April 26, 1977) (agreement to hire subcontractors on a
"merit shop," i.e., nonunion, basis).
r 483 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1973), modified, 494 F.2d 1353 (1974); see also, Tugboat, Inc., v.
Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1976) ( union has standing to sue); Carpenters Dist.
Council v. United Contractors Ass'n, 484 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1973), modified, 539 F.2d 1092
(1976).
55 483 F.2d at 389-90.
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not be entitled to the protection of the nonstatutory labor exemption.56
Relying on Justice White's view in United Mine Workers v. Pen-
nington5 that "collective bargaining agreements may violate the Sher-
man Act 'even though the mechanism for effectuating the purpose of
the combination was an agreement on wages,' ,,51 the Third Circuit
found that "[allthough the [conspiring] contractors . . . would not be
directly setting prices on commodities in the usual sense . . . , they
could nevertheless be conspiring to set a price on labor which would
affect prices and margin of profit."'59 Thus, TGU was part of an em-
ployers' conspiracy to eliminate competitors in various markets for con-
struction services. Because of this predatory intent, the court held the
unions' complaint legally sufficient.
The courts' reasoning in the sham-union cases suggests that a suc-
cessful antitrust claim could be based upon a conspiracy among em-
ployers in a unionized product market to eliminate competitors by get-
ting rid of the union representing their employees and thereby reducing
their labor costs. An antitrust challenge to such employers' conduct ex-
tends the reasoning in Heat & Frost Insulators by equating for anti-
trust purposes any and all means of destroying a union with the sham-
union technique. Although the factual basis for such a challenge comes
close to those in cases in which section 1 claims have been dismissed, 0
that result can be avoided if the overall purpose of the employers' anti-
union campaign is to reduce labor costs and eliminate competing em-
ployers, thereby impairing the competitive structure of a product
market.
Whether allegations of that ultimate anticompetitive goal would
sustain an antitrust challenge to an employers' anti-union campaign is
now at issue in Seafarers International Union v. American Commercial
Lines.6 1 The plaintiff, SIU, has alleged that the defendant employers
conspired to eliminate competitors in the market for barging services
along the Mississippi River and in the Gulf of Mexico.6 2 The alleged
method employed was to eliminate SIU from the defendants' operations
by, among other things, blacklisting all seamen registered at the union's
hiring halls and encouraging employees to file decertification petitions
with the National Labor Relations Board."3 The district court's ruling
Id. at 392.
a 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
483 F.2d at 392 (quoting Pennington, 381 U.S. at 663).
s' 483 F.2d at 392.
60 See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
01 No. 80-1565 (E.D. La. Nov. 12, 1980) (granting stay pending NLRB order).
• Complaint at 8, Seafarers.
3 Id. at 10-13. The complaint alleges that representatives of American Commercial Lines
(ACL), National Marine Services (NMS), Dixie Carriers, and ACL's affiliated barging compa-
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on the defendants' motion to dismiss has been deferred pending an
NLRB decision in associated unfair labor practice proceedings.
3. Anticompetitive Acts Affecting Only a Labor Market
Group boycotts and price-fixing, when carried out by buyers in a
product market, are per se violations of section 1.64 With respect to the
purchase of one particular service-labor-such practices are known as
blacklisting and wage-fixing, respectively. Are blacklisting or wage-
fixing therefore unlawful in themselves, without regard to their effects
upon competition in a product market?65 The fundamental issue is
whether section 1 prohibits employers' anticompetitive conduct affecting
only a labor market.
nies, were all present at a meeting during which Kilroy, ACL's representative, presented a plan to
eliminate competitors by undertaking an anti-union campaign against Seafarers, the collective bar-
gaining representative of the barging companies' employees:
In or about November 1978, defendant Kilroy, representing himself to be an
agent of [ACL's parent corporation], ACL and its defendant subsidiaries, and rep-
resentatives of NMS and Dixie met in New Orleans. At that meeting, Kilroy pro-
posed and urged a strategy for eliminating SIU from the operations of NMS and
Dixie and ACL's defendant subsidiaries by drastically reducing its membership and
its revenues, and undermining the goodwill and allegiance of seamen to SIU by
demonstrating to the seamen in the area of dominance that SIU could not be relied
upon as a source of job referrals or as an effective collective bargaining representa-
tive. He stated that the purpose of eliminating SIU was to reduce labor costs and
other operating restraints caused by SIU in the area of dominance, and to enable
the conspirators to capture an additional share of the market in that area from
employers with SIU contracts. The tactics to implement the strategy Kilroy urged
included but were not limited to:
(i) boycotting and blacklisting all seamen registered at SIU-operated hiring
halls . . . and hiring seamen from non-union related sources;
(ii) terminating contributions to all existing joint union-managment employee
benefit funds, such as pension and welfare funds for SIU seamen;
(iii) denying non-employee SIU representatives access to vessels aboard
which were SIU members; and
(iv) inducing and encouraging employees to file petitions with the National
Labor Relations Board to decertify SIU as their collective bargaining representative.
The author serves as counsel to SIU in this case.
" See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); see also supra text accompa-
nying note 30. Although most group boycott and price-fixing cases involve conduct by sellers of
goods or services, the same conduct is equally unlawful when done by buyers. See, e.g., Mande-
ville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948) (price-fixing); An-
derson v. Shipowners' Ass'n, 272 U.S. 359 (1926) (group boycott); Eastern States Retail Lumber
Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914) (group boycott).
" The Supreme Court has established that anticompetitive acts in or affecting a labor mar-
ket-blacklisting, for example-may violate § 1 if they are part of anticompetitive conduct affect-
ing a product market. See, e.g., Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
Radovich had been blacklisted for signing a contract with the World Football League. The Court
also has upheld § I violations based upon labor market restraints that are in themselves lawful,
but suppress competition in a product market. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657 (1965); see also Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967) (employers
agreed not to hire each other's employees for six months after termination); Union Circulation Co.
v. FTC, 241 F.2d 652 (2nd Cir. 1957) (magazine subscription solicitation agencies agreed not to
hire anyone who had worked for another such agency in the past year).
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In Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers v. J.P. Stevens &
Co.,66 the district court held that blacklisting and wage-fixing do not in
themselves violate section 1. Interpreting Apex and its progeny67 to re-
quire "'some form of restraint upon commercial competition in the
marketing of goods and services' " for a section 1 violation,6" and find-
ing that neither blacklisting nor wage-fixing involved such restraint, the
court held that the alleged blacklisting and wage-fixing "d[id] not rise
to the level of an anti-trust violation." 69 In the view of the district court
and several commentators, 0 Stone's use of the term "commercial com-
petition" in Apex refers to the competitive structure of a product mar-
ket only, not a labor market. In that view, Stone modified "competi-
tion" with the term "commercial" in order to refer only to transactions
regarding goods and services between entrepreneurs.
But Stone's use of the phrase "commercial competition" in Apex is
ambiguous. Under an alternative interpretation, it is "competition," not
"commercial," that is the key word in the phrase. The question before
the Court in Apex was whether preventing a shipment of goods in in-
terstate commerce violated the Act. Stone concluded that it did not. He
could have used "commercial competition" to distinguish between con-
duct that does or does not affect the competitive structure of a product
market. The phrase "commercial competition" thus would have pro-
vided a principled distinction between the union's preventing the ship-
ment of finished stockings, which Stone did not consider unlawful
under section 1, and agreeing to fix the price of stockings or to appor-
tion customers, which Stone indicated would violate section 1.
This latter interpretation of "commercial competition" is prefera-
ble for several reasons. First, it fits the facts of Apex. Stone found that
the union's activities in fact had affected the product market for hosiery
and yet were lawful. Thus, the distinction between anticompetitive acts
affecting a product market and those affecting only a labor market was
irrelevant to the issue before him. Any statements restricting the scope
6 475 F. Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), vacated as moot, 638 F.2d 7 (2nd Cir. 1980).
The district court in JP. Stevens cited, inter alia, Prepmore Apparel v. Amalgamated
Clothing Workers, 431 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971), Kennedy
v. Long Island R.R., 319 F.2d 366 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963), and United
Brick & Clay Workers v. Junction City Clay Co., 158 F.2d 552 (6th Cir. 1942), as Apex's
progeny. 475 F. Supp. at 489-90.
'0 475 F. Supp. at 488-89 (quoting Apex, 310 U.S. at 495).
6 Id. at 490.
70 See, e.g., Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L.
REV. 252, 254-55 (1954); Handler, Labor and Antitrust: A Bit of History, 40 ANTITRUST L.J.
233, 235 (1971); St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law at the Expense of Labor Law, 62 VA. L.
REV. 603, 606 (1976). But see 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 202 (1978) ("em-
ployers agreeing on trade restrictions in the labor market are subject to the same antitrust sanc-
tions as usual when collective bargaining is not involved").
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of the Act to anti-competitive activities affecting only the product mar-
ket would have been obiter dicta. More significantly, Stone's focus on
the difference between activities that restrict competition in a market
and those that do not is what distinguishes Stone's conclusion from that
of the dissenters.7
Second, if Stone's observation had been meant to restrict section l's
scope to anticompetitive activities affecting only product markets,
Stone's failure to discuss Anderson v. Shipowners Association 2 would
have been a glaring and inexplicable omission, particularly in view of
Stone's efforts to discuss all the pertinent Supreme Court antitrust deci-
sions.73 In Anderson almost all the owners and operators of American
flag merchant vessels sailing along the Pacific Coast were members of
the defendant Shipowners Association, which had established hiring
halls with stringent procedures for supplying seamen to its members'
vessels. If a seaman failed to follow these procedures and apply for
work through the hiring hall, he was precluded from employment on
an Association member's vessel. Anderson, a well-qualified, veteran
seaman who had not complied with all the hiring hall procedures and
therefore was denied such employment, brought a class-action suit on
behalf of himself and other seamen, claiming that the employers' black-
listing violated section 1. The Supreme Court held that Anderson's
complaint stated a valid section 1 claim. It seems unlikely that Stone
would have failed to distinguish or expressly overrule Anderson, a case
decided while he was on the Court, if he had subscribed to the view
that the Act applies only to impairments of competition in a product
market: Anderson would have been recent precedent to the contrary.'
Third, Stone's opinion relied on common law restraint-of-trade
cases as an important determinant of section l's meaning.7 5 One cate-
gory of agreements held to be unlawful restraints of trade around 1890
were contracts in which an employee promised not to seek similar em-
ployment for what was deemed an unreasonable period of time follow-
7' See Apex, 310 U.S. at 522 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
72 272 U.S. 359 (1926).
73 See Apex, 310 U.S. at 495 & n.16, 500.
74 One contemporary commentator who believed that Apex restricted the Act to anticompeti-
tive conspiracies affecting a product market acknowledged Apex's inconsistency with Anderson,
but sought to resolve the contradiction by reinterpreting Anderson as a restraint on commercial
competition because it was imposed by an agreement among commercial competitors. Cavers,
Labor v. The Sherman Act, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 246, 250-51 n.9 (1941). That resolution is untena-
ble, because even though competing employers adopted the restraint in Anderson, the restraint
itself was directed at and affected competition in the labor market only. Nothing in the facts of
Anderson as stated by the Court indicates any effect on competition in the shipping industry along
the Pacific Coast.
75 See 310 U.S. at 497-501.
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ing termination of the current employment.7 6 State courts held those
contractual provisions to be unenforceable, even though they restrained
competition only in a labor market.7 ' Thus, if Stone had viewed the Act
as limited to the impairment of competition in product markets, his
view would have been inconsistent with one of the premises of his argu-
ment in Apex.
Even if Stone had intended to restrict the Act's application to con-
duct affecting the competitive structure of a product market, subsequent
antitrust cases would have undermined that restriction. United States v.
National Association of Real Estate Boards,78 a more recent Supreme
Court decision, adopts a definition of "trade" under the Sherman Act
that includes the labor of an employee.79 This holding can be reconciled
with Apex only by adopting the view that "commercial competition"
includes competition in a labor market, because an employee's sale of
labor is "trade or commerce." 80 Moreover, by now a spate of antitrust
cases have held that employers' joint conduct suppressing competition
78 See generally Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REv. 625
(1960); Goldschmid, Antitrust's Neglected Stepchild: A Proposal for Dealing with Restrictive
Covenants Under Federal Law, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1193 (1973).
" See, e.g., Lanzit v. J.W. Sefton Mfg. Co., 184 Il1. 326, 56 N.E. 393 (1900); Herreshoff v.
Boutineau, 17 R.I. 3, 19 A. 712 (1890). Similarly, covenants binding persons not to engage in a
competing business in any capacity, including as an employee, were held unenforceable. See, e.g.,
Carroll v. Giles, 30 S.C. 412, 9 S.E. 922 (1889); Keeler v. Taylor, 53 Pa. 467 (1867); Lange v.
Werk, 2 Ohio St. 519 (1853); Alger v. Thacker, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 51 (1837).
78 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
78 In Real Estate Bds., the Court held that fixing the rate of commissions for real estate
brokers' services violates § 3 of the Sherman Act. Finding that the "critical question" it faced was
"whether the business of a real estate agent is included in the word 'trade'" as used in the Sher-
man Act, 339 U.S. at 489, the Court adopted Justice Story's broad definition of "trade," which
had originated in a vastly different context:
[Tihe word "trade" is often, and indeed generally, used in a broader sense, as
equivalent to occupation, employment, or business, whether manual or mercantile.
Wherever any occupation, employment, or business is carried on for the purpose of
profit, or gain or a livelihood, not in the liberal arts or in the learned professions, it
is constantly called a trade. Thus, we constantly speak of the art, mystery, or trade
of a housewright, a shipwright, a tailor, a blacksmith, and a shoe maker, though
some of these may be, and sometimes are, carried on without buying or selling
goods.
Id. at 490-91 (quoting The Nymph, 18 F. Cas. 507 (C.C.D. Me. 1834) (No. 10,388)). Justice
Story was interpreting the Coasting and Fishery Act of 1793, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 305 (current version
codified in scattered sections of 46 U.S.C.). The Supreme Court previously had adopted Justice
Story's definition of "trade" in Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 434-37
(1932). Both of these cases arose under § 3 of the Sherman Act, which is based on Congress's
plenary power to govern the District of Columbia, rather than § 1, which is based on the com-
merce clause. But the Supreme Court indicated that § 1 should be read in pari materia with § 3
when, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975), a § 1 case, it relied on Real
Estate Bds. in defining "trade or commerce."
80 In 1890, when the Sherman Act was passed, the term "trade" included a person's busi-
ness, calling, or means of livelihood. See Comment, Personal Services and the Antitrust Laws, 1
WAYNE L. REV. 124, 129 & n.28 (1955); see also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,
51 (1911); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 279-81 (6th Cir. 1898), modi-
fied and aIfd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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for the purchase of professional athletes' labor violates section 1.81
Those cases, some of which do not discuss Apex at all, do not restrict
section 1's scope to anticompetitive activities affecting a product mar-
ket.82 For example, in Flood v. Kuhn,83 the Supreme Court decision
upholding baseball's exemption from the antitrust laws solely for his-
torical reasons, dissenting Justices Douglas and Brennan would have
denied the exemption and held that forbidding an employee, such as
Flood, from practicing his profession violates section 1. Finally, al-
though the vitality of Apex continues to be recognized, numerous lower
federal courts have acknowledged in recent years that the Sherman Act
extends to anticompetitive activities affecting only a labor market.
84
If, then, Apex does not restrict section 1's scope to effects on a
product market, the antitrust challenge in J.P. Stevens was wrongly
dismissed,85 and claims against blacklisting and wage-fixing should be
actionable under that section.
The conclusion that employer's blacklisting or wage-fixing may vi-
olate section 1 rests on the premise that the sale of labor is "trade or
commerce." At first glance, that premise flies in the face of section 6 of
81 See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v. Na-
tional Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Lin-
seman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977) (granting preliminary injunc-
tion); Robertson v. National Baskeball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Bowman v.
National Football League, 402 F. Supp. 754 (D. Minn. 1975) (granting preliminary injunction);
Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), af'd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 941 U.S. 907 (1979); Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F.
Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D.
Cal. 1971). Although these courts often describe the market affected by the defendants' unlawful
conduct as "the market for players' services," professional athletes are as much "employees" under
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976), and Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.) as are other,
lower-paid and less famous wage laborers. Like other employees, they are represented for collec-
tive bargaining purposes by labor organizations. See Reynolds v. National Football League, 584
F.2d 280, 282 (8th Cir. 1978); Note, The Professional Athlete and the First Amendment: A
Question of Judicial Intervention, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 417, 432 n.74 (1976). Since the players'
services are merely a particular type of labor, the market for players' services is a labor market.
2 See, e.g., Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 616-18 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
83 407 U.S. 258, 287 & n.2 (1972); see also Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S.
1204, 1205 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1971).
4 See, e.g., Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378, 1381 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1982); Hen-
nessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136, 1150-51 (5th Cir. 1977); Newburger,
Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1081-83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1977);
Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., 552 F.2d 90, 101-03 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823
(1977); Quinonez v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 540 F.2d 824, 828-29 (5th Cir. 1976); Cesnik
v. Chrysler Corp., 490 F. Supp. 859, 864 (M.D. Tenn. 1980); Blank v. Preventative Health
Programs, 504 F. Supp. 416, 418 (S.D. Ga. 1980); Baughman v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 391 F.
Supp. 671, 677 n.2 (W.D. Pa. 1975), aiTd in part, remanded on other grounds, 530 F.2d 529 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976); Jacobi v. Bache & Co., 377 F. Supp. 86, 95-96
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd, 520 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976); Cor-
dova v. Bache & Co., 321 F. Supp. 600, 604-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
s5 See supra text accompanying notes 66-70.
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the Clayton Act, the first sentence of which states that "[tihe labor of a
human being is not a commodity or article of commerce." '86 Whether
that sentence means what it literally says is a question integrally re-
lated to the judicial and legislative history underlying the statutory la-
bor exemption. That exemption, as well as section 6's meaning, is dis-
cussed in the next section of this Article.
II. THE STATUTORY LABOR EXEMPTION
A. Protection for Organized Labor
The statutory labor exemption is the result of organized labor's
efforts over twenty-five years to right the Supreme Court's wrong in
Loewe v. Lawlor.17 By holding the Sherman Act88 applicable to labor
organizations and their activities, the Court in Loewe legitimized and
encouraged the federal judiciary's use of Sherman Act injunctions to
regulate labor-management relations from the employers' perspective.
The history of organized labor's efforts to obtain statutory relief from
antitrust liability is well-known and can be summarized briefly.89
In 1914 Congress passed the Clayton Act,90 a major addition to
the antitrust laws that contained two provisions designed to immunize
labor organizations from antitrust liability in at least some respects.
Section 6 provides:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of
commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be con-
strued to forbid the existence and operation of labor. . . organiza-
tions, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having
capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain indi-
vidual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out
the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the
members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or
conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.91
Section 20 prohibits federal courts from enjoining certain specified acts
"involving or growing out of a dispute concerning terms and conditions
of employment" and includes a catch-all clause making such acts law-
a 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976).
208 U.S. 274 (1908).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
See generally Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325
U.S. 797, 801-06 (1945); F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
0 Oh. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 18 U.S.C. §§ 402,
660, 3285, 3691, and 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 53 (1976)).
" 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976).
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ful, notwithstanding any other federal legislation.2 The labor move-
ment was joyous at the passage of these provisions, believing that it had
achieved its goal of freeing its economic weapons from injunctive and
other restraints.93
The Supreme Court, however, quickly read section 6 as simply a
restatement of pre-existing law, which provided that the mere existence
of a labor organization did not violate the Act, thereby dashing organ-
ized labor's belief that section 6 was its "Magna Charta.' '94 Moreover,
the Court gutted the force of section 20 by holding that it only pro-
tected acts growing out of labor disputes between employees and their
immediate employer.95 As a result, although labor organizations them-
selves were not illegal and in some cases strikes also were not, secon-
dary boycotts and, in many circumstances, strikes and picketing, re-
mained subject to antitrust liability.9
Again organized labor sought redress from Congress. This wave of
lobbying, politicking, and congressional hearings culminated in the
92 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976). That section states:
No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United
States, or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case between an employer and em-
ployees, or between employers and employees, or between employees, or between
persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a
dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent
irreparable injury to property, or to a property right, of the party making the appli-
cation, for which injury there is no adequate remedy at law, and such property or
property right must be described with particularity in the application, which must
be in writing and sworn to by the applicant or by his agent or attorney.
And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or per-
sons, whether singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of employment, or
from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or
persuading others by peaceful means so to do; or from attending at any place where
any such person or persons may lawfully be, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining
or communicating information, or from peacefully persuading any person to work
or to abstain from working; or from ceasing to patronize or to employ any party to
such dispute, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful
and lawful means so to do; or from paying or giving to, or withholding from, any
person engaged in such dispute, any strike benefits or other moneys or things of
value; or from peaceably assembling in a lawful manner, and for lawful purposes;
or from doing any act or thing which might lawfully be done in the absence of such
dispute by any party thereto; nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be
considered or held to be violations of any law of the United States.
93 See Gompers, Labor Not A Commodity, 21 AM. FEDERATIONIST 866 (1914), quoted in 51
CONG. REC. 16,340 (1914) (statement of Rep. Buchanan); see also Mason, The Labor Clauses of
the Clayton Act, 18 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 489 (1924).
9' See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 449-53 (1921); Paine Lumber
Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459 (1917). Gompers had described § 6's first sentence as the "Industrial
Magna Charta upon which the working people will rear their structure of industrial freedom."
Gompers, The Charter of Industrial Freedom: Labor Provisions of the Clayton Antitrust Law, 21
AM. FEDERATIONIST 957, 971-72 (1914).
95 See Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927); Du-
plex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
"6 See Sayre, Labor and the Courts, 39 YALE L.J. 682, 695-704 (1930).
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Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932,"' which was intended primarily to pro-
hibit the yellow-dog contract9" and to restrict the jurisdiction of federal
courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes. Like section 20 of the
Clayton Act, section 4 of the new law specified certain conduct which
could not be enjoined if it involved or grew out of a labor dispute.99
The term "labor dispute" was broadly redefined to circumvent the Su-
preme Court's prior misinterpretation of section 20's scope.100 Section
5 of the new law prohibited federal courts from enjoining as an unlaw-
ful combination or conspiracy section 4 conduct done in concert. 101
This time the Supreme Court got the message. In Milk Wagon
Drivers Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products,0 2 the Court held that
sections 4 and 5 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act prevent federal district
Ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3692, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115
(1976)).
03 A yellow-dog contract is one that binds an employee not to become or remain a member of
a union. See 29 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
99 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976). That section states:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of
any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in
such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in
concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment;
(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of any
employer organization, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as is de-
scribed in section 103 of this title;
(c) Paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person participating or in-
terested in such labor dispute, any strike or unemployment benefits or insurance, or
other moneys or things of value;
(d) By all lawful means aiding any person participating or interested in any
labor dispute who is being proceeded against in, or is prosecuting, any action or suit
in any court of the United States or of any State;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor
dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not
involving fraud or violence;
() Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their
interests in a labor dispute;
(g) Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any of the acts
heretofore specified;
(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts heretofore
specified; and
(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or vio-
lence the acts heretofore specified, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as
is described in section 103 of this title.
100 See infra note 154.
101 29 U.S.C. § 105 (1976). That section states:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue a restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction upon the ground that any of the per-
sons participating or interested in a labor dispute constitute or are engaged in an
unlawful combination or conspiracy because of the doing in concert of the acts enu-
merated in section 104 of this title.
102 311 U.S. 91 (1940).
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courts from enjoining a secondary boycott, specifically rejecting the em-
ployers' argument that injunctions still could be issued against unions
for Sherman Act violations.
1 0 3
This was the legal context for Justice Frankfurter's classic formu-
lation of the statutory labor exemption in United States v. Hutche-
son.x°4 In that case the federal government sought to prosecute officers
of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters under section 1 of the Sher-
man Act for a secondary boycott of certain employers in the course of a
work assignment dispute with another union. The Court had held in
Milk Wagon Drivers that such a secondary boycott could not be en-
joined under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The issue in Hutcheson, then,
was whether action that is not within the scope of section 20 of the
Clayton Act - such as a secondary boycott - could be the basis for a
criminal conviction. Although the Norris-LaGuardia Act clearly pro-
tects such action against injunctive relief, it lacks section 20's catch-all
clause immunizing the actors from criminal liability as well.
05
Frankfurter's approach to the issue was to show, based on judicial
and legislative history he well knew,106 that section 20's catch-all
phrase should be applied to all union activities specified in section 4 of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act:
The Norris-LaGuardia Act reasserted the original purpose of the
Clayton Act by infusing into it the immunized trade union activi-
ties as redefined by the later Act. In this light § 20 removes all
such allowable conduct from the taint of being a "violation of any
law of the United States," including the Sherman Law.
07
That same judicial and legislative history counselled against the view
that pre-Norris-LaGuardia-Act precedent1 0 applied to criminal, but
not injunctive, proceedings against union activities. Frankfurter argued
that it read Congress's intent in passing the Norris-LaGuardia Act too
narrowly "to say that that which on the equity side of the court is
allowable conduct may in a criminal proceeding become the road to
103 Id. at 100-03.
104 312 U.S. 219 (1941>.
10' See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
106 Frankfurter wrote the classic study of the judicial and legislative history leading up to the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, see F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 7, and was actively en-
gaged in the drafting of the law. Id. at 226 n.61.
'0' Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 236.
208 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921). In Duplex the Court en-
joined under the Act a nationwide secondary boycott instigated by the defendant union to aid in its
attempt to organize plaintiff's factory. In reaching this result, the Court limited the scope of the
term "labor dispute" in § 20 of the Clayton Act to disputes over the terms and conditions of
employment between employees and their immediate employers. Id. at 469-78.
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prison."' 0 He then concluded:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine
with non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit under § 20 are not to
be distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwis-
dom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of
the end of which the particular union activities are the means.11
The significance of Frankfurter's opinion far transcends the reso-
lution of the particular dispute in Hutcheson. His reasoning applies
equally to treble damage antitrust actions against labor organizations,
and his approach has shaped the contours of labor antitrust law to this
day. Instead of first deciding whether the government's indictment (or
the plaintiff's complaint) was legally sufficient under section 1, as Stone
had done so comprehensively just a year before in Apex and did again
in his Hutcheson concurrence,"" Frankfurter looked at whether the
challenged conduct fell within the provisions of section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act and therefore was immunized by section 20's catch-all
phrase. If it did, then "it would be idle to consider the Sherman Law
apart from the Clayton Act as interpreted by Congress. Cf. Apex Ho-
siery Co. v. Leader.""' 2 Following Hutcheson, the predominant ap-
proach to labor antitrust cases has been to focus attention first on
whether the union's challenged conduct is exempt and then, only if it is
not, to consider whether that challenged conduct violates section 1 of
the Act.
Thus, the statutory labor exemption is based substantially on the
dialogue between Congress and the federal courts regarding the Act's
applicability to trade union conduct. The focus of this dialogue was on
the liability of unions, not employers. In contrast to the experience of
labor organizations, employers had been the targets of few labor injunc-
tions prior to the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and apparently
had engaged in no anti-injunction lobbying. It seems unlikely, there-
fore, that in passing the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts, Congress
intended to relieve employers of any antitrust liability."' This conclu-
"' Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 234-35.
110 Id. at 232 (footnote omitted).
"I Id. at 237.
112 Id. at 236.
11 This same general argument has met with only mixed success in injunctive actions under
§ 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act by unions against employers to preserve the status
quo pending arbitration of a grievance. Some courts have held that the protections of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act are unavailable to employers. See, e.g., Milk & Ice Cream Drivers v. Gillespie
Milk Prods. Corp., 203 F.2d 650 (Oth Cir. 1953); United Steel Workers v. Blaw-Knox Foundry
& Mill Machines, 319 F. Supp. 636, 640 (W.D. Pa. 1970); Textile Workers v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94
F. Supp. 626 (M.D.N.C. 1950). But others have held that the Act protects employers in injunctive
actions brought by unions. See, 'e.g., Amalgamated Transit Union v. Greyhound Lines, 550 F.2d
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sion is borne out by the specific legislative history underlying pertinent
provisions of the two Acts.
B. Section 6 of the Clayton Act Vis-a-Vis Employers' Conduct
Does the first sentence of section 6 of the Clayton Act-"The la-
bor of a human being is not a commodity or article of com-
merce" 4-1remove anticompetitive employers' conduct affecting only a
labor market from the reach of the Sherman Act? Most courts consider-
ing that question have viewed section 6 as a "one-way street," ' 5 pro-
tecting labor unions but not protecting employers.1 " Their conclusion
is justified by an analysis of the pertinent legislative history.
The first sentence of section 6 was added to the Clayton Bill in the
Senate, after the provision had passed the House. It was presented in
the Senate Judiciary Committee's report as follows:
That nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be con-
strued to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural,
or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purpose of mutual
help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to
forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from
lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such
organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be
illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade under the
antitrust laws.L17
On September 1, 1914, Senator Cummins of Iowa proposed a sub-
stitute for section 6 that changed the language of the Committee's ver-
1237 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977); International Union of Elec. Workers v. Wald
Mfg. Co., 260 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Ky. 1966); International Longshoreman & Warehousemen v.
Libby, McNeill & Libby, 114 F. Supp. 249 (D. Hawaii 1953); Local 937, United Automobile
Workers v. Royal Typewriters Co., 88 F. Supp. 669 (D. Conn. 1949); United Packing House
Workers v. Wilson & Co., 80 F. Supp. 563 (N.D. I1. 1948). These holdings are distinguishable
from the question of antitrust immunity. The Sherman Act, unlike § 301 of the Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act, pre-dates the Norris-LaGuardia Act. In addition, antitrust exemptions are to
be narrowly construed, see, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51
(1963).
"* 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976).
... Cordova v. Bache & Co., 321 F. Supp. 600, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
... See, e.g., California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 648 F.2d
527, 532-33 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 998 (1982); Mackey v. National Football
League, 543 F.2d 606, 616-18 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Robertson v.
National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 884-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Cordova, 321 F. Supp. at
605-06; see also Cesnik v. Chrysler Corp., 490 F. Supp. 859, 865 (M.D. Tenn. 1980); Amalga-
mated Clothing & Textile Workers v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 475 F. Supp. 482, 488 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), vacated as moot, 638 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1980); 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 70, at
199. But see Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, 371 F.2d 332, 335-36 (7th Cir. 1967).
1' S. REP. NO. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1914). It should be noted that § 6 of the
Clayton Act was numbered § 7 of the Clayton Bill and it is referred to as § 7 throughout the
congressional debates.
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sion and incorporated provisions from what later became section 20 of
the Clayton Act:
That the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of
commerce, and nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be
construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor organiza-
tions having for their objects bettering the conditions, lessening the
hours, or advancing the compensation of labor, nor to forbid or
restrain individual members of such organizations from carrying
out said objects in a lawful way; nor shall said laws be construed
to prevent or prohibit any person or persons, whether singly or in
concert, from terminating any relation of employment or from
ceasing to work or from advising or persuading others in a peace-
ful, orderly way, and at a place where they may lawfully be, either
to work or abstain from working, or from withholding their pa-
tronage from a party to any dispute growing out of the terms or
conditions of employment or from advising or persuading other
wageworkers in a peaceful and orderly way so to do, or from pay-
ing or giving to or withholding from any person engaged in such
dispute any strike benefits or other moneys or things of value, or
from assembling in a peaceful and orderly way for a lawful pur-
pose in any place where they may lawfully be, or from doing any
act or thing which might lawfully be done in the absence of such
dispute. Nothing contained in said antitrust laws shall be construed
to forbid the existence and operation of agricultural, horticultural,
or commercial organizations instituted for mutual benefit without
capital stock and not conducted for the pecuniary profit of either
such organization or the members thereof, or to forbid or restrain
such members from carrying out said objects in a lawful way.""8
In support of his proposed substitute, Cummins explained that he
thought it preferable for section 6 to state the goals of labor organiza-
tions more precisely, to incorporate the other labor-related provisions of
the bill, to add nonprofit mutual benefit commercial organizations to
the list of protected organizations and, of most importance here, to dis-
tinguish labor from the commodities it produces. 1 9
During this explanation, Cummins elaborated upon the impor-
tance of the distinction between labor and commodities:
[T]he labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of
commerce. It is high time that we recognize the difference between
the power of a man to produce something and the thing which he
produces. Society has the right to regulate the sale and the trans-
portation of the thing produced, but society has no right, according
1's 51 CONG. REC. 14,546-47 (1914).
,,9 Id. at 14,585-87.
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to our views of civilization, to say that a man who has the capacity
to work shall work. He is free to either work or to abstain from
working. He is free to persuade others to abstain from working.
The thing in which he is dealing is not a commodity, and if we do
not recognize the difference between the labor of a human being
and the commodities that are produced by labor and capital and
their transportations throughout the country we have lost the main
distinction which warrants, justifies, and demands that labor orga-
nizations coming together for the purpose of bettering the condi-
tions under which they work, of lessening the hours which they
work, and of increasing the wages for which they work shall not be
reckoned to be within a statute which is intended to prevent re-
straint of trade and monopoly.
120
Cummins had made similar statements at other times during the Sen-
ate's deliberations on section 6.121
The debate on Cummins' proposed substitute centered primarily
on whether it granted to labor organizations protection from antitrust
liability as broad as that provided by the Committee's version of section
6. Committee members maintained that it did not.1 22 When a vote was
taken on the Cummins amendment, it was rejected.
23
Immediately thereafter, Senator Culbertson, Chairman of the Ju-
.diciary Committee, proposed that the first sentence of Cummins' substi-
tute be added to the Committee's version of section 6 as its first sen-
tence. Culbertson's proposal was adopted without debate. 124
Section 6 of the Clayton Bill passed the Senate in that form. The
Conference Report accepted the Senate amendments and the bill passed
both Houses with section 6 unchanged. 2 5 The only comments in the
Senate about the first sentence of section 6 following Culbertson's
amendment were those of Senators Nelson and Volstead (both of whom
voted against the entire bill), who expressed concern that it might pre-
vent Congress from legislating on behalf of laborers and labor organi-
zations in the future.1 26 Congressman Webb, who explained to the
House the Senate amendments adopted by the Conference Committee,
stated that the first sentence of section 6 was "a mere legislative decla-
ration or postulate" having no effect.1
27
Thus, the overall purpose of section 6 was to exempt labor organi-
20 Id. at 14,585 (emphasis added).
121 See id. at 14,018, 14,586.
122 See id. at 14,587-90.
123 Id. at 14,590.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 15,940.
126 Id. at 15,940, 16,283.
127 Id. at 16,276.
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zations, inter alia, from antitrust liability for legitimate activities pri-
marily affecting a labor market. The Cummins amendment was re-
jected in its entirety because it did not go far enough toward that goal.
Therefore, the Senators adopting the first sentence of Cummins'
amendment must have believed that it was consistent with the Senate's
(and subsequently also the House's) purpose in enacting section 6. Pre-
sumably Culbertson proposed his amendment for the reason Cummins
stated in support of the first sentence-because that sentence "warrants,
justifies and demands" that labor organizations in and of themselves do
not violate the Sherman Act. At no point in the Senate debates on sec-
tion 6 did anyone suggest that its new first sentence would serve to
exempt from antitrust liability anyone other than the organizations
mentioned in the rest of the provision - that is, labor, agricultural,
and horticultural organizations.
This legislative history clearly shows that section 6 was intended
to protect labor organizations, not to exempt from antitrust liability all
conduct affecting only a labor market on the ground that labor is not a
commodity. Indeed, many courts have found such conduct violative of
the antitrust laws.12 Twelve years after the passage of section 6, when
the Supreme Court in Anderson v. Shipowners' Association129 held that
it violated section 1 of the Sherman Act for employers to blacklist
seamen who did not use their hiring hall, the Court did not even men-
tion section 6. It is only because nearly seventy years have elapsed since
the Clayton Act became law and memories have faded that it is neces-
sary to argue now what was crystal clear back then.
C. Section 20 Of The Clayton Act and Sections 4, 5, and 13 of the
Norris-La Guardia Act Vis-a-Vis Employers' Conduct
Employers may try to immunize their conduct by invoking the
statutory labor exemption from the antitrust laws based on section 20
of the Clayton Act'3 0 and the Norris-LaGuardia Act.1 3 ' The question
whether the exemption extends to employers' conduct should be an-
swered, if possible, by reference to congressional intent. This essentially
was Frankfurter's approach when labor claimed the protection of the
legislation in Hutcheson.12 Since the Court has not interpreted that
128 See supra note 84.
1-9 272 U.S. 359 (1926).
130 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976). See supra note 92 for entire text.
13- 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976). Section 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976), is
sometimes included as a component of the exemption. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors, 648
F.2d at 532.
132 See supra text accompanying notes 104-10.
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intent with respect to employers' immunity from antitrust liability,
analysis must begin with the legislative history of the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act. That statute's proscription against injunctions covers a broader
category of labor disputes than does section 20 of the Clayton Act,133
and the question of immunizing employers' conduct was posed in the
debates on the Senate bill that became the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
1 34
When that bill was presented to the Senate, it contained a state-
ment of public policy explaining Congress' reason for passing the legis-
lation. Such a statement was still uncommon in 1932 and there was
some debate as to its necessity or propriety.13 5 Senator Norris, the au-
thor of the bill, defended the statement of policy as a guide to judicial
interpretation that would "relieve ...many of the difficulties which
have heretofore existed when a court has been called upon to interpret
the law" 6 - obviously thinking of the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the Clayton Act.13 7 The statement of policy, contained in section 2 of
the bill, read as follows:
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the
aid of governmental authority for owners of property to organize in
the corporate and other forms of ownership association, the indi-
vidual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual
liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby
to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, where-
fore, though he should be free to decline to associate with his fel-
lows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of his own choos-
ing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and
that he shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of
employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such rep-
resentatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
tection, therefore, the following definitions of and limitations upon
the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the United States are
enacted.1
38
Senator Hebert, who authored the Senate Judiciary Committee's
minority report on the bill, proposed a substitute to the Committee's
version of section 2:
"' See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 269-71 (1947).
13 S. 935, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932).
135 See S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 11-14 (1932); 75 CONG. REC. 4503 (1932)
(statement of Sen. Norris); id. at 4626 (statement of Sen. Blaine); see also H.R. REP. No. 669,
72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1932).
'36 75 CONG. REC. 4503 (1932).
137 See supra text accompanying notes 90-103.
13 S. REP. NO. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1932).
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Whereas under prevailing economic conditions a single em-
ployee is helpless in dealing with an employer, is ordinarily depen-
dent on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and his fam-
ily, is unable to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment; and
Whereas it is essential
(a) That he shall be free to associate with his fellow workers
and to form unions which will afford him and them the opportu-
nity to deal on a basis of equality with those by whom they are
employed;
(b) That they may share equitably in the product of labor
and capital;
(c) That both the employer and the employee shall have full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, to negotiate the terms of employ-
ment free from any interference, restraint, or coercion in their ef-
forts toward mutual aid or protection."3 9
Hebert explained, with particular reference to subsection (c), that his
proposed substitute was designed to provide more "consideration" to
employers than was provided in the Committee's statement of policy:
The declaration of policy in the minority bill tries to afford the
same degree of consideration to the employer in his relations to his
employee as it does to the employee in his relations with his em-
ployer. We have made no distinction in our declaraction of policy
between one and the other, whereas in the declaration of policy
contained in the majority bill there is very little, if any, reference to
the consideration that is to be given to the employer in his relations
with his employee.' 4 °
When the debate on Senator Hebert's substitute commenced, sev-
eral Senate Judiciary Committee members spoke directly to the substi-
tute's antitrust implications. Senator Walsh of Montana questioned
what need there was to express support for employers' right to associate
and whether the substitute's policy declaration "would not trench upon
the acts enacted by Congress for curbing monopoly." 1" Senator Norris
raised the antitrust issue more explicitly: "[I]f we put in the other pro-
vision, the one the Senator has in here [Hebert's substitute], . . . these
great combinations of wealth would say in the next lawsuit that this
action of Congress relieved them from all responsibility of organization
under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act." '42 Senator King shared that
concern:
19 75 CONG. REC. 4677 (1932) (emphasis added).
140 Id. at 4678.
141 Id. at 4763.
142 Id. at 4764.
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The language employed is susceptible of the interpretation placed
upon it by the Senator from Montana, and in its present form I
would be afraid that it would be construed to mean that employers
had the right to combine, and in such a manner as would be viola-
tive of either the Clayton or the Sherman antitrust laws.' "
Senator Hebert responded by claiming that no violation of the anti-
trust laws by employers would be immunized by subsection (c).1
44
Following that colloquy, Hebert's substitute was defeated
soundly.1 5 That vote, considered in light of the preceding debate's fo-
cus on employers' antitrust immunity, makes it quite clear that in pass-
ing the Norris-LaGuardia Act Congress had no intent to relieve em-
ployers of any liability under the antitrust laws.
The conclusion that neither section 20 of the Clayton Act nor the
Norris-LaGuardia Act was intended to immunize employer conduct
from antitrust liability is implicit in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, In-
ternational Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.14 There the Court held
that Local 3 was liable under section 1 of the Sherman Act for combin-
ing with electrical contractors and manufacturers in New York City in
order to eliminate competition from electrical equipment manufacturers
who did not have a collective bargaining agreement with Local 3. Al-
though the Court viewed the union's conduct as growing out of a labor
dispute and thus falling within both section 20 and the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act, 47 the Court imposed liability on Local 3 because "Congress
never intended that unions could, consistently with the Sherman Act,
aid non-labor groups to create business monopolies and to control the
marketing of goods and services. 1"14
The plaintiff electrical manufacturer in Allen Bradley did not sue
the business group with whom Local 3 combined. The Court therefore
rendered no holding on the employers' antitrust liability and did not
address any immunity argument on their behalf. The Court did, how-
ever, indicate its view of the employers' conduct: "Quite obviously, this
combination of business men has violated both §§ 1 and 2 of the Sher-
man Act, unless its conduct is immunized by the participation of the
union." 4 9 The Court's statement that it was the union's participation
that might have immunized the employers' conduct, not section 20 or
the Norris-LaGuardia Act as applied directly to the employers, implies
143 Id. at 4765.
144 Id.
145 The vote was 18 in favor, 47 opposed. Id. at 4766.
146 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
147 Id. at 807 n.12.
148 Id. at 808.
14, Id. at 800 (footnote omitted).
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that the Court did not believe that those statutory provisions could pro-
tect employers' unilateral conduct from antitrust liability. In the
Court's view, the union's conduct was not immune. If the Clayton and
Norris-LaGuardia Acts, which were intended to immunize organized
labor from antitrust liability, did not protect Local 3's conduct growing
out of a labor dispute, they surely would not protect the same conduct
if unilaterally undertaken by employers.
Just recently, the Supreme Court stated in H.A. Artists and Asso-
ciates v. Actors' Equity Association that "a party seeking refuge in the
statutory [labor] exemption must be a bona fide labor organization, and
not an independent contractor."1 50 Although that statement was dic-
tum, it reflects the holdings in a line of cases in which independent
contractors and even entrepreneurs were accorded the protection of the
statutory labor exemption only because they were considered to be a
"labor group" in light of their particular relationship to a bona fide
union and its members.151 The assumption underlying these cases is the
conclusion the Court expressed as dictum in Actors' Equity.
Even if the Norris-LaGuardia Act did immunize employers' uni-
lateral conduct, the scope of such an exemption would be narrowly lim-
ited by the terms of the Act. Section 4 is the basis for the antitrust
immunity accorded in section 5, and the only subsection in section 4
that refers to an employer's activities is 4(b), which prohibits injunc-
tions barring "any person or persons participating [in a labor dispute]
from ... [b]ecoming or remaining a member .. .of any employer
organization." '52 That provision merely immunizes from antitrust lia-
bility the formation and maintenance of multiemployer bargaining
units; it does not immunize the collaborative acts of employers outside
that structure, nor even the acts of such units when they do not serve
the collective bargaining purposes for which they were intended.
53
Moreover, the statutory labor exemption applies only to conduct
growing out of a "labor dispute" within the meaning of section 13 of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 54 Following American Medical Association
, 451 U.S. 704, 717 n.20 (1981).
'~' Compare American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99 (1968) (band leader and
musicians are "labor group") with Los Angeles Meat & Provision Drivers Union v. United States,
371 U.S. 94 (1962) (notwithstanding their membership in a common union, grease peddlers and
drivers were not "labor group") and United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfg. Ass'n, 336 U.S.
460, 463-64 (1949) (stitching contractor is entrepreneur, not laborer, despite furnishing chiefly
labor) and Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942) (dispute between in-
dependent fisherman and processor of fish over terms of sale not a "labor dispute").
:' 29 U.S.C. § 104(b)(1976).
53 See Associated Gen. Contractors, 648 F.2d at 543-45.
154 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1976). That section provides as follows:
The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms or condi-
tions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in
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v. United States,155 it is highly unlikely that unilateral anticompetitive
conduct by employers in and affecting a product market would be con-
sidered an outgrowth of a labor dispute. In that case the government
brought a criminal prosecution against the American Medical Associa-
tion (AMA), its District of Columbia and Illinois affiliates, and others
for conspiring to prevent Group Health from providing medical care
and hospitalization on a risk-sharing, prepayment basis. The AMA
sought to protect the practices of its member doctors by preventing
Group Health from hiring doctors as employees and from obtaining
certain hospital services. The Court upheld the defendants' conviction,
expressly rejecting their argument that their conduct was immunized by
section 20 and the Norris-LaGuardia Act. In the Court's view, the dis-
pute between the defendant associations and Group Health "was not
one concerning terms and conditions of employment." 15 The Court
elaborated:
The petitioners [the defendants] did not represent present or pro-
spective employes. Their purpose was to prevent anyone from tak-
ing employment under Group Health. They were interested in the
terms and conditions of the employment only in the sense that they
desired wholly to prevent Group Health from functioning by hav-
ing any employes. Their objection was to its method of doing busi-
ness. Obviously there was no dispute between Group Health and
the doctors it employed or might employ in which petitioners were
either directly or indirectly interested.
117
In essence, the Court's reasoning was that the defendants-who were
not labor organizations-were engaged in a dispute with a competing
employer in a product market. The dispute was therefore not within
the scope of section 13's definition of a "labor dispute."
158
This same conclusion would apply, for example, to an employers'
group boycott of union-signatory firms, such as that in Associated Gen-
eral Contractors.59 The employers' boycott of such firms is based, as in
American Medical Association, on their "method of doing business,"
that is, bargaining collectively with a union. The absurdity of holding a
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions
of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee.
1 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
156 Id. at 533.
7 Id. at 536 (emphasis added).
'58 Cf Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 102 S. Ct. 2673
(1982) (Norris-LaGuardia Act applies whenever employer-employee relationship is matrix of
controversy).
" California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 648 F.2d 527 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 998 (1982).
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group boycott in a product market to be a labor dispute just because a
union is the plaintiff in a lawsuit challenging the boycott's lawfulness is
shown by considering whether the same argument could be raised if the
boycotted union-signatory firms had been plaintiffs instead. In light of
the Court's holding in American Medical Association, it would be un-
tenable to maintain that the conspiring employers were engaged in a
labor dispute with the boycotted plaintiffs. How, then, could such an
argument succeed when the same conduct by the same employers is
challenged by a different injured party - a union?
In sum, legislative history, statutory language, and Supreme Court
precedent all point to one conclusion: with the exception of the forma-
tion and maintenance of multiemployer bargaining units, neither the
Clayton Act nor the Norris-LaGuardia Act protects employers' conduct
from antitrust liability.
III. STANDING
A. The Problems of Section 4 Standing
The federal antitrust laws establish two private causes of action
for violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act. An action for injunctive
relief may be maintained under section 16 of the Clayton Act, which
provides that "[a]ny person, firm, corporation, or association shall be
entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief. . . against threatened loss
or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws."160 A treble damage
action may be brought under section 4 of the Clayton Act, which pro-
vides that "any person who shall be injured in his business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor
. ..and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained." 6
It is generally recognized that sections 4 and 16 impose different
standing requirements." ' A plaintiff seeking an injunction needs to sat-
isfy only the usual requirements for such relief in a court of equity:163 a
threatened injury-in-fact will suffice.'" Since labor organizations
would lose dues income, at least, from every legally sufficient section 1
claim described in Part 1,165 they would have standing to sue for in-
'so 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
161 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
162 See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 260-64 (1972); Associated Gen.
Contractors v. Otter Tail Power Co., 611 F.2d 684, 689 (8th Cir. 1979); Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobil
Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. 1976); In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481
F.2d 122, 130-31 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973). But see Long Island Lighting Co.
v. Standard Oil Co., 521 F.2d 1269, 1274 (2nd Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976).
16 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
164 See, e.g., Tugboat, 534 F.2d at 1174.
16" See supra text accompanying notes 51-85.
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junctive relief based on each of those claims. The same conclusion ap-
plies to any employee who would lose a job or the opportunity to seek
employment as a result of any of those alleged antitrust violations.
The standing issue is not so simple, however, with respect to treble
damage actions. An award of treble damages is a particularly potent
remedy for a section 1 violation, which can be expected to cause "rip-
ples of harm to flow through the Nation's economy." '166 Recognizing
this, federal courts have felt the need to limit the expansive liability
that would result from a literal reading of section 4.17 Until the Su-
preme Court squarely addressed the question of a plaintiffs standing to
sue for treble damages in Blue Shield v. McCready6 this year, the
lower federal courts were forced to fashion their own limitations on a
plaintiff's right to sue for treble damages. In that vacuum, the courts of
appeals imposed a "legal causation" requirement upon a treble damage
plaintiff's right to sue: in addition to the requirement of injury to busi-
ness or property caused in fact by an antitrust violation,"6 9 plaintiff's
injury also must have been "legally caused" by the violation 70
Unfortunately, each court of appeals has adopted its own version
of the legal causation requirement and some appellate courts have
adopted more than one. The most common formulation is the "target
area" test: to have standing under section 4 of the Clayton Act, the
plaintiff must be foreseeably within "that area of the economy which is
endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in [the] particular
industry." ' Other circuits have adopted the categorization approach,
focusing on the relationship between the plaintiff and the alleged anti-
trust offender.1 2 Under this approach, plaintiffs are categorized into
certain classes, such as lessees, employees, or stockholders; the court
14 Blue Shield v. McCready, 102 S. Ct. 2540, 2547 (1982).
"' See Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378, 1382-83 (9th Cir. 1982); Tugboat, 534
F.2d at 1174-75. See generally Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust
Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809, 810-13 (1977).
168 102 S. Ct. 2540 (1982).
,e, See, e.g., Tugboat, 534 F.2d at 1175; see also Berger & Bernstein, supra note 167, at
810-11. The Supreme Court has acknowledged this development. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,
405 U.S. 251, 262 n.14 (1972).
170 See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 167, at 810-11.
171 Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952); see also Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539,
546-47 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 927 (1981); In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollu-
tion, 481 F.2d at 126-29; Calderone Enters. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, 454 F.2d
1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972). See generally Berger & Bernstein,
supra note 167, at 830-35.
172 See, e.g., Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727, 731 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 938 (1973); Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383, 394-95 (6th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963); Productive Inventions Inc. v. Trico Prods. Corp.,
224 F.2d 678, 679 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956); Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910). See generally Berger & Bernstein, supra note 167, at 820-30.
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determines whether a plaintiff has standing by referring to an estab-
lished body of case law that applies to each category." 3 Still other cir-
cuits have used a "zone of interest" test derived from administrative
law to determine whether the plaintiff's injury arguably falls within the
zone of interest the antitrust laws were designed to protect.17 4 And re-
cently, at least two circuits have rejected each of these "bright line"
tests for a more policy-based balancing approach.
17 5
This divergence of standards has resulted in doctrinal chaos among
the circuits - and sometimes even within a single circuit.17 1 In addi-
tion, the vagueness intrinsic to each of the standards has resulted in
inconsistent decisions even among courts using the same standard.
17 7
The issue of standing under section 4 is further complicated by the
closely related, but analytically distinct, concept of "antitrust injury"
articulated in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat.78 Brunswick
was an action brought for violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act,
which proscribes mergers whose effect "may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly. ' 179 That provision is in-
tended to prevent anticompetitive effects before they occur. The defen-
dant Brunswick, one of the two largest American manufacturers of
bowling equipment, acquired and then operated certain bowling centers
in competition with those owned by the plaintiffs. Seeking treble dam-
ages and other relief, the plaintiffs claimed that Brunswick's "deep
pocket" would enable it to undertake predatory practices in a market of
much less wealthy competitors. The jury found section 7 liability and
the plaintiffs were awarded treble damages. The court of appeals re-
manded, but concluded that if the plaintiffs could show that the ac-
quired bowling centers would have gone out of business but for Bruns-
wick's actions, the plaintiffs would be entitled to treble damages based
on their lost profits.
The Supreme Court disagreed. Justice Marshall, writing for a
unanimous Court, pointed out that every merger, lawful or unlawful,
adversely affects some persons, but that it would not serve the purposes
"' In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d at 127; Berger & Bernstein, supra
note 167, at 820-830.
174 See, e.g., California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 648 F.2d
527, 537-38 & n.18 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 998 (1982); Malamud v. Sinclair Oil
Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1151-52 (6th Cir. 1975).
'7" See, e.g., Ostrofe, 670 F.2d 1378, 1383-86 (9th Cir. 1982); Bravman v. Bassett Furniture
Indus., 552 F.2d 90, 99 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977).
"' See Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1382 & n.7. See generally Berger & Bern-
stein, supra note 167, at 819-45.
7 Ostrofe, 670 F.2d at 1383 & n.7. See generally Berger & Bernstein, supra note 167, at
840 n.139.
178 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
179 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
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of the antitrust laws to award damages for a merger unlawful under
section 7 unless the injury sustained was the result of that which made
the merger unlawful."" The merger in Brunswick was unlawful be-
cause "deep-pocket" Brunswick had the potential for predatory pricing
in the market for bowling services. But this was unrelated to the plain-
tiffs' loss of profits, since the plaintiffs would have suffered the same
injury if the acquired bowling centers had been purchased by a smaller,
less profitable company than Brunswick. Thus, concluded the Court,
"if respondents [plaintiffs] were injured, it was not 'by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws': while respondents' loss occurred
'by reason of' the unlawful acquisitions, it did not occur 'by reason of'
that which made the acquisition unlawful."""
Justice Marshall then described the Court's holding in very broad
language:
We therefore hold that for plaintiffs to recover treble damages
on account of § 7 violations, they must prove more than injury
causally linked to an illegal presence in the market. Plaintiffs must
prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the anti-
trust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which
makes defendants' acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the an-
ticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts
made possible by the violation.8 '
This passage inaugurated the "antitrust injury" concept.
The precise meaning and applicability of this concept were un-
clear until the Court decided Blue Shield v. McCready 8 Was it, as
the language of Marshall's opinion suggests, something broader than
the Court's holding that treble damages for injuries resulting from in-
creased competition do not serve the purposes underlying section 4 and
therefore may not be recovered? Did the concept of antitrust injury
apply to violations of antitrust laws other than section 7 of the Clayton
Act? 8 4 What was the relationship between "standing" and "antitrust
injury"?'"
In short, the question whether a plaintiff has standing to sue for
treble damages under section 4 traditionally has been difficult to an-
swer. In 1982, for the first time, the Supreme Court confronted that
question head-on.
1so 429 U.S. at 489.
181 Id. at 488.
182 Id. at 489 (emphasis in original).
183 102 S. Ct. 2540 (1982).
164 See Ostrofe, 670 F.2d at 1386 & n.22 (citing cases).
'85 See id. at 1386 & n.23; see also Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An
Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 467, 497-500 (1980).
19821
160 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 131:127
B. Blue Shield v. McCready
In 1978 Carol McCready commenced a class action on behalf of
herself and other Blue Shield subscribers who had paid fees for psycho-
therapy performed by a psychologist. These fees had not been reim-
bursed by Blue Shield. The complaint alleged that Blue Shield and the
Neuropsychiatric Society of Virginia, an organization of Virginia psy-
chiatrists, had conspired to exclude psychologists from the market for
psychotherapy services in Virginia. In furtherance of that conspiracy,
McCready alleged, Blue Shield had refused to reimburse its subscribers
for psychotherapy performed by psychologists, while providing reim-
bursement for comparable treatment by psychiatrists. The complaint
further alleged that Blue Shield's deliberate failure to reimburse pay-
ments to psychologists constituted a group boycott in violation of section
1 of the Sherman Act and injured subscribers' property, entitling sub-
scribers like Carol McCready to an award of treble damages under
section 4 of the Clayton Act."'6
Adopting the "target area" test for section 4 standing,' the dis-
trict court dismissed the complaint on the ground that McCready
lacked standing: because the goal of the alleged boycott was to exclude
psychologists from the psychotherapy market, the sector of the economy
competitively affected consisted of those psychologists in the psychother-
apy market, not unreimbursed Blue Shield subscribers.' The Fourth
Circuit reversed, holding that Blue Shield's failure to reimburse caused
McCready an "immediate and direct" property loss.' 89 In concluding
that McCready had standing, the appellate court pointed out that the
policies underlying the "target area" test were inapplicable to Mc-
Cready's claim: since McCready already had paid her psychologist his
fee, her damages were not speculative or difficult to prove and there
was no danger of a duplicative recovery. 90
The Supreme Court affirmed, five to four. Writing for the Court,
Justice Brennan avoided using any of the talismanic legal causation
formulations established by the courts of appeals, adopting instead a
policy-based approach to the question of McCready's standing to sue.
Noting section 4's broad and unqualified language, Congress's "'ex-
pansive remedial purpose in enacting § 4,' " and the broad scope given
section 4 in recent Supreme Court decisions,19' Brennan stated the ma-
188 See Mc~ready, 102 S. Ct. at 2543-44.
'87 See supra text accompanying note 171.
1" 102 S. Ct. at 2544.
'89 McCready v. Blue Shield, 649 F.2d 228, 231 (4th Cir. 1981).
10 Id. at 231-32.
191 McCready, 102 S. Ct. at 2545 (quoting Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 313-14
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jor premise of his opinion: "in the absence of some articulable consider-
ation of statutory policy suggesting a contrary conclusion in a particular
factual setting, we have applied § 4 in accordance with its plain lan-
guage and its broad remedial and deterrent objectives." 19 2 Thus, Bren-
nan suggested, a plaintiff whose injury fell within the literal language
of section 4 and whose recovery of treble damages would serve the com-
pensatory and deterrent policies underlying the provision presumptively
would have standing to sue for treble damages. Brennan then identified
"two types of limitation on the availability of the § 4 remedy," the risk
of duplicative recoveries and the remoteness of the injuries from the
antitrust violation. 193 He further defined two elements of the remote-
ness limitation:
(1). . . the physical and economic nexus between the alleged vio-
lation and the harm to the plaintiff, and, (2) more particularly,
: * , the relationship of the injury alleged with those forms of in-
jury about which Congress was likely to have been concerned in
making defendant's conduct unlawful and in providing a private
remedy under § 4.19
This second element, of course, echoes the concept of antitrust injury
articulated in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat 95
Brennan agreed with the circuit court that McCready's suit posed
no risk of duplicative recoveries. Since the psychologist had been paid,
he could not also claim damages. 96 Moreover, since the amount of the
reimbursement due McCready could be determined to the penny, there
was no problem of speculative or abstract damages97
Consistent with the district court's opinion, the defendants argued
that McCready's injury was too remote from the alleged violation, be-
cause the alleged conspiracy was directed at psychologists in the psy-
chotherapy market, not Blue Shield subscribers. 9 Brennan rejected
this argument, which would have limited the class of proper plaintiffs
to psychologists, because "[t]he availability of the § 4 remedy . . . is
not a question of the specific intent of the conspirators." ' In his view,
McCready's injury was inextricably intertwined with the alleged viola-
tion, since it was the means to the conspirators' end:
(1978)).
102 Id.
193 Id. at 2545, 2546-47.
194 Id. at 2548.
lob 429 U.S. 477 (1977). See supra text accompanying notes 178-82.
1" 102 S. Ct. at 2546.
'' Id. at 2547 n.11.
193 Id. at 2548.
19 Id.
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Denying reimbursement to subscribers for the cost of treatment
was the very means by which it is alleged that Blue Shield sought
to achieve its illegal ends. The harm to McCready and her class
was clearly foreseeable; indeed, it was a necessary step in effecting
the ends of the illegal conspiracy. 00
Relying on language in Brunswick that in order to constitute an
antitrust injury "[t]he injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect
either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the
violation," the alleged conspirators also argued that McCready's injury
was too remote because it did not reflect the anticompetitive effect of
the alleged boycott against psychologists.2"' Regardless of whether Mc-
Cready's injury was a consequence of a lessening of competition in the
market for psychotherapy services, Justice Brennan did not read Bruns-
wick so expansively: despite its language, Brunswick did not require
plaintiff's injury to reflect the antitrust violation's anticompetitive effect.
In his view, since McCready's injury was a consequence of acts in fur-
therance of the alleged antitrust conspiracy, her injury "'flow[ed] from
that which [made] defendants' acts unlawful' within the meaning of
Brunswick, and [fell] squarely within the area of congressional
concern."
20 2
Justice Rehnquist's dissent, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice O'Connor, took issue with the majority primarily on this last
point. According to Rehnquist, the majority's view that McCready's in-
jury was not too remote because her injury was "a necessary step in
effecting a conspiracy to place third parties at competitive disadvan-
tage" was foreclosed by the antitrust injury concept in Brunswick.2"3
Rehnquist interpreted Brunswick to require that McCready's injury be
the type of harm that made the challenged practice illegal.20 4 There-
fore, Rehnquist argued, plaintiffs do not suffer antitrust injury unless
they can show that the challenged practice is illegal with regard to its
effect upon them.2 05 McCready lacked standing, in Rehnquist's view,
because she did not allege that the challenged boycott had any anticom-
petitive effect on her, as opposed to its effect on psychologists perform-
ing psychotherapy. 20
Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that McCready had suf-
fered no injury to her property because of Blue Shield's reimbursement
"0 Id. at 2549.
101 Id. at 2550 (quoting Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489).
1*1 Id. at 2550-51 (quoting Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489).
1*1 Id. at 2553 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
204 Id.
205 Id. at 2555.
206 Id.
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practice: since McCready presumably knew that she would not be re-
imbursed for psychotherapy by a psychologist and yet she still sought
psychotherapy by her psychologist, she must have "received in ex-
change psychotherapeutic services that presumably were worth the [un-
reimbursed] payment."20 7
The major virtue of Justice Brennan's McCready opinion is the
adoption of a policy-based approach to section 4 standing, integrating
pre-existing legal causation formulations and the antitrust injury con-
cept. As some courts of appeals and commentators have recognized,208 a
policy-based approach offers the possibility of a coherent body of stand-
ing decisions - a possibility apparently unattainable using any of the
"bright line" legal causation tests. While adopting, in essence, a pre-
sumption that plaintiffs have standing if their injuries fall within the
literal language of section 4 - and if allowing recovery would serve the
statute's compensatory and deterrent purposes - Brennan's opinion
identifies at least some of the countervailing policies.209 Moreover, Mc-
Cready clarifies several of the ambiguities inherent in Brunswick. The
antitrust injury concept is not limited solely to violations of section 7 of
the Clayton Act, but plays a part in evaluating any antitrust injury's
remoteness for standing purposes. And Marshall's broad language in
Brunswick that the plaintiff's injury should "flow from that which
makes defendant's acts unlawful"210 does not require that a section 4
plaintiff's injury be caused by the anticompetitive effect of the chal-
lenged conduct; an injury resulting from the means used to effectuate
an anticompetitive end enables the injured party to sue for treble
damages.21
Brennan's opinion suffers, however, from some major ambiguities
of its own. First, some of the countervailing policy limitations are
vaguely described. What are "speculative, abstract or impractical dam-
age theories" ?212 What is the "physical . . .nexus between the alleged
[antitrust] violation and the harm to the plaintiff" ?213 How does one
identify "those forms of injury about which Congress was likely to have
been concerned in making defendant's conduct unlawful"?24 Second,
107 Id. at 2556 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103 See, e.g., Ostrofe 670 F.2d at 1383-84; Berger & Bernstein, supra note 167, at 840-83.
',' The countervailing policies Justice Brennan identified were those acknowledged in prior
Supreme Court cases. See McCready, 102 S. Ct. at 2545. There is no indication in his opinion
that the policies identified were meant to be the only countervailing policies, and the above-cited
language suggests the contrary.
210 429 U.S. at 489.
'"1 McCready, 102 S. Ct. at 2549-52.
212 102 S. Ct. at 2547 n.11.
213 Id. at 2548.
214 Id.
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Brennan does not indicate the precise relationship among the factors
relevant to section 4 standing. For example, what if there is no risk of
duplicative recovery or speculative damages, but the plaintiff's injury is
"remote"? Does remoteness in itself vitiate an injured party's status as
a treble damage plaintiff? Or, is that policy limitation somehow bal-
anced against the policies and factors favoring that party's right to
treble damages?
Moreover, Brennan's opinion provides only very limited guidance
as to the most common issue arising in antitrust standing cases -
whether the plaintiff's injury is too remote. Brennan's conclusion that
McCready's injury was not too remote rested on the fact that the type
of injury she suffered was the means to the conspirators' ultimate
goal. 15 This is a rather unusual fact pattern. In most antitrust standing
cases, the question is at what point in the chain of events caused by the
defendant's initial act does a plaintiff's injury become too remote.
216
None of the opinions in McCready prescribes a test for answering that
question, and Brennan's express refusal to endorse any of the appellate
courts' legal causation formulations only postpones that decision.
2 17
C. Section 4 Standing for Organized Labor
Before applying the policy-based standing approach adopted in
McCready to the antitrust claims discussed in Part I,21 it is worth
observing that in the last ten years organized labor often has been suc-
cessful in asserting standing under section 4. The carpenters unions
were held to have standing to sue for treble damages resulting from the
group boycott in Associated General Contractors.19 In Radovich v. Na-
tional Football League,220 a professional football player was held to
have stated a claim against the League for blacklisting him as part of a
conspiracy to destroy a competing football league, suggesting that un-
ionized employees would have section 4 standing in at least some anti-
trust cases involving unlawful conduct affecting a product market. The
plaintiff labor organizations were accorded standing in the sham-union
cases, as were the union members who lost work opportunities with the
215 Id. at 2548-49.
"' See, e.g., California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 648 F.2d
527, 536-39 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 998 (1982).
217 102 S. Ct. at 2547 n.12.
218 See supra text accompanying notes 51-85.
219 California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 648 F.2d 527,
536-39 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 998 (1982). See supra text accompanying notes
13-14.
220 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
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defendant employers as a result of the "sweetheart agreements.12 21 The
professional athlete cases and others establish that an injured employee
has standing to sue for damages resulting from unlawful employers'
conduct affecting a labor market.222 Although labor organizations can-
not sue in a representative capacity for treble damages on behalf of
their members, 223 those members can bring a class action in their own
right.224
Under a policy-based standing approach, organized labor should
be just as successful. For example, blacklisted employees or employees
whose wages were reduced as a result of a wage-fixing conspiracy
should have section 4 standing to challenge the lawfulness of such labor
market conduct. The employees' loss of jobs, work opportunities, or
wages would be compensable injury to their business and property, and
their damages could be estimated with sufficient precision so as not to
be speculative.225 Moreover, as the direct and intended victims of such
unlawful concerted action, those employees would be well-suited to de-
ter such violations by bringing suit. The limitations on section 4 stand-
ing articulated in McCready would not apply. Since the employees
would be competitors in the market affected by the illegal conduct, their
injury would be direct, not remote, and there would be no risk of dupli-
cative recoveries.
Since individual employees often lack the resources to finance an
221 Compare Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172, 1176-77 (5th Cir. 1976)
(employees have standing only when they themselves are targets of conspiracy, e.g., when defen-
dants conspire to keep union members off job sites) with Carpenters Dist. Council v. United
Contractor's Ass'n, 484 F.2d 119, 121-22 (6th Cir. 1973), modified, 539 F.2d 1092 (6th Cir.
1976) and International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v. United Contractors Ass'n, 483 F.2d
384, 397 (3d Cir. 1973), modified, 494 F.2d 1353 (3d Cir. 1974) (employees have standing when
their employers are targets of conspiracy, where allocation of loss between employer and employ-
ees is possible).
222 See, e.g., Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378, 1381-82 (9th Cir. 1982); Hennes-
sey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136, 1147-48 (5th Cir. 1977); Bravman v.
Bassett Furniture Indus., 552 F.2d 90, 95-96 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977); Mackey
v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 616-17 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801
(1977); Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (D. Conn. 1977); Robertson
v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
223 See, e.g., NAACP v. New York Clearing House Ass'n, 431 F. Supp. 405, 410 & n.26
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) and cases cited therein; see also Associated Gen. Contractors v. Otter Tail Power
Co., 611 F.2d 684, 689 n.5 (8th Cir. 1979) and cases cited therein; Amalgamated Clothing &
Textile Workers v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 475 F. Supp. 482, 488 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), vacated as
moot, 638 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1980); Cordova v. Bache & Co., Inc., 321 F. Supp. 600, 604 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
224 See, e.g., Anderson v. Shipowners Ass'n, 272 U.S. 359 (1926); J.P. Stevens, 475 F. Supp.
at 488 n.5; Cordova v. Bache & Co., 321 F. Supp. 600, 604-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
225 The Court in McCready noted that "the feasibility and consequences of implementing
particular damages theories may. . . be considered in determining who is entitled to prosecute an
action brought under § 4.. . .It may therefore be appropriate to consider whether a claim rests
at bottom on some abstract conception or speculative measure of harm." 102 S. Ct. at 2546-47
n.11.
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antitrust lawsuit, they may resort to class actions or request assistance
from their union. A labor organization conceivably could function as
class representative for a class of its member-employees. In addition,
labor organizations might well have standing to sue for treble damages
based on their own injuries. For example, when employees are black-
listed because of their union membership, the union may be able to
prove a loss of dues income or an impairment of its ability to represent
employees and to attract new members. Allowing unions to seek treble
damages for such losses would serve the compensatory and deterrent
purposes underlying section 4,227 especially since blacklisted employees
may not have the financial resources or motivation to sue and therefore
antitrust violators otherwise might go unpunished.
The standing limitations most clearly implicated in such suits
brought by unions are the risks of duplicative recoveries and speculative
damage awards. Because dues income derives from employees' wages, a
blacklisting employer who pays a blacklisted employee three times his
lost wages in damages and also pays a union three times its lost dues
income is subjected to duplicative recovery of a portion of the employ-
ees' wages. This risk can be avoided, however, whenever it is possible
to allocate damages so that the employer pays the blacklisted employee
treble damages for that portion of his lost wages which is not siphoned
off for union dues and pays the union threefold its loss of dues income.
This sort of allocation is easy to perform whenever the amount of union
dues bears a fixed relationship to wages earned. Such allocation would
also be consistent with McCready, since the Supreme Court precedent
establishing the risk of duplicative recoveries as a legitimate section 4
standing limitation expressly contemplates an exception for situations
in which allocation of damages is possible.
228
2 6 Unions serve as class representatives in title VII cases. See, e.g., International Woodwork-
ers v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 568 F.2d 64 (8th Cir. 1977); Local 194, Retail, Wholesale and Dep't
Store Union v. Standard Brands, Inc., 540 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1976).
"" See McCready, 102 S. Ct. at 2545.
In support of the countervailing policy against the risk of duplicative recoveries, the Court
in McCready cited Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), and Hanover Shoe v. United
Shoe Mach., 392 U.S. 481 (1968). 102 S. Ct. at 2546. In Hanover Shoe, the Court held that an
antitrust defendant could not mitigate its obligation to pay damages arising from illegal
overcharges to the plaintiff, a direct purchaser, by demonstrating that the plaintiff had "passed
on" the cost of such overcharges to consumers. 392 U.S. at 488-89. Conversely, the Court in
Illinois Brick held that consumers and other indirect purchasers in most instances lack antitrust
standing to sue a producer for injury passed on to them by a direct purchaser. 431 U.S. at 729-
36. By proscribing the use of "passing-on" theory, both defensively (as in Hanover Shoe) and
offensively (as in Illinois Brick), the Court sought, inter alia, to prevent duplicative recoveries by
indirect and direct purchasers resulting from the same illegal overcharge. The Court in Hanover
Shoe, however, recognized an exception to its general rule, applicable to situations involving "cost-
plus" contracts. Under such agreements there is little danger of duplicative recovery because the
exact amount of the overcharge passed on to the indirect purchaser may be determined and, ac-
cordingly, damages may be allocated between indirect and direct purchasers. See Hanover Shoe,
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The problem of speculative damage awards, however, may bar
standing in many cases in which a union claims treble damages for
injury to its ability to represent employees and organize workers, unless
an event can serve to measure the extent of the injury. For example, if
it could be demonstrated that blacklisting led to decertification of a
union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the blacklisting em-
ployers' employees, the union's injury to its ability to represent employ-
ees - its loss of membership and thus of income from that bargaining
unit - probably could be documented with sufficient precision to avoid
being barred as speculative. Proving such a loss would not be very dif-
ferent from proving a business entity's loss of profits, a common mea-
sure of a corporation's antitrust injury.229
Remoteness of the union's injury is also a problem. The union's
injury - loss of dues and fees - would be derivative of its members'
loss of wages and thus one step removed from the initial impact of the
antitrust violation. McCready dictates no conclusion about whether
such injury would be too remote, since the opinion addressed the re-
moteness issue in very different factual circumstances. It would be con-
sistent with McCready, however, to analogize the remoteness issue to
the tort concept of proximate cause.230 The point in the causal chain
beyond which treble damages could not be recovered would then be
defined by the foreseeability of the injury, a concept underlying both
proximate cause 23  and one version of the target-area test for antitrust
standing.23 2 In fact, Brennan himself obliquely uses foreseeability as a
yardstick in concluding that McCready's injury was not too remote.2 33
Antitrust lawsuits in which the plaintiffs are labor organizations
or unionized employees challenging unlawful conduct in a product
market present the most difficult standing problems. Although the risks
of duplicative recoveries and speculative damages may be involved in
some such suits, the limitation most obviously militating against section
4 standing for plaintiffs in product-market-based lawsuits is remote-
ness. Unions and unionized employees are at least one step removed
from the antitrust violations because an anticompetitive purpose or ef-
fect vis-a-vis one or more business entities in the relevant product mar-
ket is that which makes the challenged conduct unlawful. The injury to
392 U.S. at 494; see also Berger & Bernstein, supra note 167, at 862.
22 See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 260-63 (1946); Greyhound
Computer Corp., v. International Business Machines Corp., 559 F.2d 488, 505 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978).
230 See McCready, 102 S. Ct. at 2548 & n.13.
231 See, e.g., W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 43 (4th ed. 1971).
231 See, e.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 220 (9th Cir.
1964).
233 See 102 S. Ct. at 2549.
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the union or unionized employees is, at least in one sense, derivative of
the injury to the business entities competing in the relevant market.
But McCready makes it clear that a party suffering derivative in-
juries still may have section 4 standing. Just as Carol McCready had
standing even though she was not a competitor in the psychotherapy
market, 3 4 unions and unionized employees might have section 4 stand-
ing even though they are not competitors in a product market. Al-
though the Court in McCready surely did not chart with precision or
completeness the contours of the remoteness limitation, it did provide
some illumination. Justice Brennan found, for example, that Mc-
Cready's injury was not too remote because it was "the very means by
which it is alleged that Blue Shield sought to achieve its illegal
ends."'228 The injuries suffered by the plaintiff unions in the sham-
union cases236 and Seafarers"' are similar to McCready's: elimination
of the unions was the means by which the defendant employers sought
to drive their competitors out of business. The unions, like McCready,
should be deemed to have standing because their injuries were "a nec-
essary step in effecting the ends of the illegal conspiracy."'2 38
The carpenters' unions' injury in Associated General Contrac-
tors239 also is "inextricably intertwined"24 with the antitrust violation
alleged, but in a different sense. Injury to the carpenters' unions was
not a means to the boycott of union-signatory subcontractors; it was a
necessary concomitant, since only subcontractors who were signatory to
collective bargaining agreements with the unions were subject to the
group boycott. This was the basis for the Ninth Circuit's conclusion
that the injury to the carpenters' unions was not merely foreseeable, but
also intended.241
The Court's opinion in McCready suggests that such an intended
injury would not be too remote. Although the Court rejected specific
intent as a criteria for remoteness, 2 it apparently did so in order to
expand the class of section 4 plaintiffs beyond those whose injuries
were specifically intended; when plaintiffs are intended victims of anti-
trust violations, a fortiori their injuries would not be too remote.
'" See supra text accompanying notes 198-200.
235 102 S. Ct. at 2549.
2" See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
237 Seafarers Int'l Union v. American Commercial Lines, No. 80-1565 (E.D. La. Nov. 12,
1980). See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
2" 102 S. Ct. at 2549.
"' California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 648 F.2d 527 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 998 (1982). See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
24' McCready, 102 S. Ct. at 2551.
2" Associated Gen. Contractors, 648 F.2d at 538.
24 102 S. Ct. at 2548.
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Nor would the injury to the carpenters' unions be too remote in
terms of the antitrust injury concept. Their injury "flows from that
which makes defendants' acts unlawful," since the anticompetitive pur-
pose and effect of the group boycott - that which makes the Associated
General Contractors' conduct a section 1 violation - causes union-sig-
natory subcontractors to lose jobs on construction projects and that, in
turn, causes the carpenters' unions to lose dues income and other fees.
In sum, organized labor's standing to sue for treble damages will
depend upon the relationship between the particular antitrust violation
and the particular injury to business or property alleged. The standing
approach adopted in McCready is a flexible standard, still in its in-
fancy, and whether a union or unionized employees will have section 4
standing cannot be predicted in all cases. But unions or unionized em-
ployees clearly will have standing to sue for treble damages based on an
employer's unlawful conduct in many of the cases discussed in Part
1.243
IV. CONCLUSION
The analysis and arguments of this Article can now be stated with
respect to the major issues before the Supreme Court in Associated
General Contractors.
244
First, the Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit's view that the
unions' complaint states a sufficient cause of action under section 1 of
the Sherman Act. The appellate court reached that conclusion by com-
paring the challenged employers' boycott before it to the boycott of non-
signatory subcontractors resulting from the hot cargo agreement chal-
lenged in Connell.24 5 It considered the employers' group boycott to be
"the obverse of the situation described in Connell."2" Rather than re-
lying so heavily on Connell, the Supreme Court should analyze the
employers' conduct in terms of section l's traditional framework. As
indicated above,2'7 such an analysis would lead to the same ultimate
conclusion as the Ninth Circuit reached.
Second, the Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit's conclusion
that the conspiring employers are not entitled to defend their conduct
on the basis of the statutory labor exemption. The Court should sup-
... See supra text accompanying notes 51-85.
24 California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 648 F.2d 527 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 998 (1982).
245 648 F.2d at 531-32 (citing Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local
Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975)).
246 Id. at 532.
21 See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
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plement the appellate court's analysis, based on the overall purpose of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act24 and the statements and implications of
certain Supreme Court decisions,249 with the legislative history dis-
cussed above, which clearly shows that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was
not intended to protect employers from antitrust liability.
Third, the Court should use Associated General Contractors as an
occasion to adopt a foreseeability test for resolving the remoteness issue
in most antitrust standing cases. Not only would such a test be a logical
outgrowth of the Court's analysis in McCready,'5" it also would pro-
vide an objective standard with sufficient flexibility to accommodate the
particular facts of each case.
POSTSCRIPT
After this Article went to press, the Supreme Court decided Asso-
ciated General Contractors v. California State Council of
Carpenters.5 The Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that the un-
ions' complaint stated a legally sufficient antitrust claim,252 but held
that the unions lacked standing under section 4 of the Clayton Act to
maintain a treble damage action."' Justice Stevens, who wrote the ma-
jority opinion, did not address the employers' defense that their conduct
was protected by the statutory and nonstatutory labor exemptions. In
his lone dissent, Justice Marshall disagreed with the limitations the
majority opinion imposed on the scope of section 4 standing.'"
Because Justice Stevens deliberately eschewed "a black-letter rule
that will dictate the result in every case," '55 the Court's decision does
not require a denial of section 4 standing to unions in all cases. More-
over, the Court did not consider whether the unions had standing to sue
for injunctive relief under section 16 of the Clayton Act. Nor did the
majority opinion offer any guidance as to whether or in what circum-
stances employees would have standing to sue under sections 4 or 16.
Thus, although the Court's decision clearly limits organized labor's use
of the antitrust laws, it still leaves room for some treble damage actions
and does not in any way circumscribe organized labor's right to sue for
injunctive relief.
24s 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976).
24 See Associated Gen. Contractors, 648 F.2d at 532-36.
'" Blue Shield v. McCready, 102 S. Ct. 2540 (1982).
251 51 U.S.L.W. 4139 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983).
252 Id. at 4142.
253 Id. at 4146-47.
5 Id. at 4147-48 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
211 Id. at 4144.
